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Estimating the Effect of the One-Child Policy on 
Sex Ratio Imbalance in China: 
Identification Based on the Difference-in-Differences
* 
 
In China, the male-biased sex ratio has increased significantly. Because the one-child policy 
only applied to the Han Chinese but not to minorities, this unique affirmative policy allows us 
to identify the causal effect of the one-child policy on the increase in sex ratios by a 
difference-in-differences (DD) estimator. Using the 1990 census, we find that the strict 
enforcement of the one-child policy has led to 4.4 extra boys per 100 girls in the 1980s, 
accounting for about 94% of the total increase in sex ratios during this period. The robust 
tests indicate that the estimated policy effect is not likely confounded by other omitted policy 
shocks or socioeconomic changes. Moreover, we conduct the DD estimation using both the 
2000 census and the 2005 mini-census. Our estimates suggest that the one-child policy has 
resulted in about 7.0 extra boys per 100 girls for the 1991-2005 birth cohort. The effect of the 
one-child policy accounts for about 57% and 54% of the total increases in sex ratios for the 
1990s and the 2001-2005 birth cohorts, respectively. 
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According to three recent waves of population censuses in China, the sex ratio at birth has
drastically increased from 108.5 in 1982, to 113.8 in 1990, and to 119.9 in 2000, deviating
far from the biologically stable range from 103 to 107 (NBS, 2002).1 Considering the far-
reaching consequences of the persisting sex ratio imbalance on both the marriage market
and the labor market (Angrist, 2002; Becker, 1991; Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix, 2002; Rao,
1993), and even on the crime market (Dreze & Khera, 2000; Edlund et al., 2008; Hudson
& Boer, 2002),2 the problem of the male-biased sex ratio in China has drawn increasing
attention from demographers, economists, and other social scientists (e.g., Banister, 2004;
Coale & Banister, 1994; Hesketh & Xing, 2006; Qian, 2008; Tuljapurkar, Li & Feldman,
1995; Zeng et al., 1993).3
However, the cause for the increase in sex ratio has been a subject of heated debate. Oster
(2005) raises the possibility that a biological factor, hepatitis B, accounts for about 70% of
the "missing women" in China. The hepatitis B story is questioned by Das Gupta (2005).
Lin & Luoh (2008) show direct micro evidence that hepatitis B does not a⁄ect the sex ratio in
Taiwan. Oster and Chen (2008) also admit that hepatitis B does not explain male-biased sex
ratios in China. Although the biological factor of hepatitis B seems to have been excluded
from this "missing women" story originally discovered by Sen (1990), the debate has not
totally resolved. Many economists and demographers argue that the one-child policy has
been the major reason for the increase in sex ratios in China (Ebenstein, 2009; Li, 2002; Das
Gupta, 2005; Zeng et al., 1993). Guilmoto (2009) discusses that the increase in sex ratios
in Asia may be triggered by the progress in gender selection technology. Qian (2008) claims
that a substantial percentage of the increase in sex ratio is attributable to the gender wage
1The sex ratio is de￿ned as the number of males per 100 females in the reference population.
2It has also been suggested that the endogenized sex ratio by the son preference may systematically
degenerate girls to be born in low status families (Edlund, 1999).
3Porter (2007, 2008) has analyzed the e⁄ects of the male biased sex ratio on marriage, intrahousehold bar-
gaining, and intergenerational transfers; Wei & Zhang (2008) have explored the e⁄ect of sex ratio imbalance
on saving behavior in China.
1gap.
This paper argues that the increase in sex ratios in China has been a result of a combina-
tion of son preference, a decrease in fertility induced by the one-child policy, and the progress
of gender selection technology. These elements are the three indispensable ingredients in the
increase in sex ratios in China. Son preference is a cultural background; gender selection,
such as gender-selective abortion, is a necessary tool through which a desired gender can be
pursued; and the decrease in fertility induced by the one-child policy leads to increasing sex
ratios. Given son preference and gender selection technology, the frequency or intensity of
gender selection usage is di⁄erent at di⁄erent fertility levels. The increase in sex ratios is a
manifestation of the decline in fertility caused by the one-child policy. With lower fertility
coupled with gender selection to realize the desired gender, the impact of any factor on the
sex ratio is higher.4
Previous research has tried to identify the causal relationship between the one-child policy
and the increase in sex ratio by exploiting spatial and time variations in the implementation
of the one-child policy. For example, Ebenstein (2009) utilizes the regional and temporal
variation in ￿nes at provincial level for unauthorized births, and ￿nds that higher ￿ne regimes
are associated with higher sex ratios but lower fertility. The spatial and time variations of the
one-child policy, however, may be endogenous to gender selection and sex ratios in empirical
analysis.5
Our paper avoids this problem by designing a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimator based
on an exogenous di⁄erential treatment between the Han and minorities under the one-child
policy. In the quasi-experiment design of the DD estimator, both the ethnic-speci￿c het-
4The interaction between sex preference, fertility, and sex ratio has long been noticed in the literature
(Becker, 1991; Ben-Porath & Welch, 1976). Ben-Porath & Welch (1976) conjecture a possibility that parents
indirectly choose fertility to satisfy their sex preference. To test this hypothesis, however, there exists an
identi￿cation problem because the number and gender composition of children are simultaneously deter-
mined. The Chinese experience may shed light on this problem because the fertility behavior there had been
exogenously targeted by the one-child policy since 1979. Therefore, identifying the e⁄ect of the one-child
policy on sex ratio imbalance in China can help our understanding of the interaction between fertility and
sex ratios in countries where son preference is prevalent.
5It will be discussed in detail in Subsection 2.2.
2erogeneity and the e⁄ects of socioeconomic development have been swept out. Therefore,
the DD estimate is very clean, and we are able to rigorously identify the causal e⁄ect and
obtained the quantitative e⁄ect of the one-child policy on sex ratio imbalance in China.
The one-child policy stipulates that each couple is allowed only one-child. Couples are
given birth quotas, and they are penalized for "above-quota" births. However, a unique
feature of the one-child policy is that minority women were generally allowed to have at least
two children whereas the Han can only have one child.6 The di⁄erential treatment of the one-
child policy across di⁄erent ethnic groups has been embodied in various regulations (Banister,
2004; Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister, 1988; Park & Han, 1990; Scharping, 2003). In addition,
the motivation of the di⁄erential treatment of the one-child policy across ethnic groups has
been evidently exogeously imposed. Therefore, the consistently di⁄erential treatment of the
one-child policy between the Han and other minorities provides us a precious and unique
opportunity to identify its causal e⁄ect on the sex ratio imbalance in China.7
Using the Chinese population census in 1990, the estimated treatment e⁄ect on the
probability of being a boy is as large as 1.01 percentage points for the 1980s birth cohort.
This means that the strict enforcement of the one-child policy has causally increased the sex
ratio by 4.4 which accounts for about 94% of the increase in sex ratios during this period. Our
robust analysis indicates that the estimated treatment e⁄ect is unlikely confounded by other
omitted policy shocks or socioeconomic changes. We further conduct the DD estimation
using both the 2000 census and 2005 mini-census. Our DD estimates suggest the one-child
policy has increased the sex ratio by about 7.0 for birth cohort of 1991-2005. The policy
6Second birth was strictly forbidden at the early stage of the implementation of the one-child policy
after 1979. However, Central Document 7 issued in early 1984 by the Party Central Committee allows rural
couples to have a second child if the ￿rst was a girl (Peng, 1996).
7Two facts greatly substantiate the validity of our quasi-experiment design of the DD estimator. First,
there is clear evidence that the sex ratios for minorities and the Han were very close prior to the enactment
of the one-child policy but diverged signi￿cantly afterwards. Second, there is little di⁄erence in changes of
family structure, mother￿ s age at the ￿rst birth, parental characteristics, and parental labor market behaviors
between the Han and minorities during the post-treatment period. Li & Zhang (2009) construct a similar DD
estimator based on the di⁄erential treatment across ethnical groups to test the external e⁄ects of fertility
behavior. Li & Zhang (2007) also exploit the di⁄erential ethical treatment to construct an instrumental
variable to identify the e⁄ect of (endogenous) population growth on economic growth.
3e⁄ect accounts for about 57% and 54% of the increase in sex ratios for the birth cohorts in
the 1990s and 2001-2005, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background. Section
3 speci￿es the empirical strategy and introduces the data set. Section 4 reports the empirical
results. Section 5 analyzes the e⁄ects of the one-child policy by birth order. Section 6
estimates the e⁄ects of one-child policy by registration type. Section 7 conducts our robust
analysis. Section 8 carries out the DD estimation using the 2000 census and 2005 mini-census.
Section 9 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The increase in Sex Ratio in China
Although scattered historical statistics indicate that China has had a traditionally male-
biased sex ratio, the sex ratio at birth was relatively stable and was only marginally higher
than western countries from the foundation of the People￿ s Republic of China in 1949 to the
beginning of the one-child policy in 1979, except the birth cohorts of 1956-1958 who were
born just prior to the Great Famine. Based on four modern waves of the Chinese population
census after 1949 and two large-scale in-depth fertility surveys, Coale & Banister (1994)
systematically document sex ratios for the birth cohorts from 1936-1989, and convincingly
demonstrate that the reported sex ratio at birth was very close to 106-107 throughout the
1960s and 1970s.8 Figure 1 depicts the time series of sex ratios by birth cohort from 1949
to 1990 projected by the Chinese population census in 1990.9 It con￿rms that the sex ratio
in pre-policy change period before 1979 is signi￿cantly lower than that in the post-policy
change period. In fact, the mean value of the sex ratio for the birth cohorts from 1949 to
1978 is 106.6. Figure 1 also shows that the sex ratio almost experiences a monotonic increase
after 1979, and attains an unprecedented level of 113.8 in 1990.
8The four modern population censuses used in Coale & Banister (1994) were held in 1953, 1964, 1982,
and 1990, respectively; and the two in-depth fertility surveys were carried out in 1982 and 1988, respectively.
9This ￿gure is very similar to Figure 2 in Coale & Banister (1994, p.466) except that their cohort analysis
is conducted in a ￿ve-year moving average form to smooth out irregular disturbances.
4It has been claimed that a substantial percentage of the increase in sex ratio is due to the
gender wage gap (Qian, 2008). Although the correlation between the relative female income
to the total household income and the outcomes for boys and girls, including female survival
rates, has been extensively investigated in the literature (Du￿ o, 2003; Foster & Rosenzweig,
1999; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982; Thomas, 1994), the magnitude of the time series change
of gender-speci￿c earning gap does not match the magnitude of the increase in sex ratios in
China during the past three decades (Cai, Park, & Zhao, 2008; Rozelle et al., 2002). Based
on an empirical analysis on gender earning gap in China￿ s rural areas, Rozelle et al. (2002)
conclude "no evidence was found to suggest that the economic reform policies and market
competition had led to any measurable increase or decrease in gender wage discrimination".
Similarly, Figure A1 in the Appendix cites the statistics in Zhang et al. (2008) showing that
the gender earning gap has been rather stable during the past two decades in urban China,
though it has experienced a marginal increase.10 Thus, the gender-speci￿c earning gap could
account for only a small portion of the increase in sex ratios in China.
We believe that the increase in sex ratio has been a result of a combination of son
preference, the progress of gender selection technology, and low fertility rates regulated by
the one-child policy. First, son preference is a cultural background. There is no doubt that
the male-biased sex ratio in China is associated with son preference which is traditionally
rooted in Chinese society. However, the traditional son preference alone cannot explain the
recent increase in sex ratios because as a preference it is relatively stable. Second, gender
selection such as gender-selective abortion is a necessary tool. Without the progress in gender
selection technology, gender selection such as selective abortion would be infeasible, and thus
the sex ratio would not be unbalanced.11 Furthermore, regardless of which factors are the
ultimate causes of the high sex ratio, they all have to involve gender selection technology
10Descriptive statistics from various sources show that the ratio of female wages to male wages has hovered
around 80% throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which is comparable to its counterparts in the US during the
same period (Blau & Kahn, 1997; Gustafsson & Li, 2000; Meng, 1998).
11For example, during the 1970s, the total fertility rate dropped from near 6 to 2.3 under the later-longer-
fewer policy. However, there was not much change in sex ratios during this period. The absence of gender
selective induced abortion seems a plausible explanation.
5and induced abortion. However, gender selection technology alone cannot bias the sex ratio
too much when fertility is high.
Finally, the decrease in fertility induced by the one-child policy can itself lead to the rise
in sex ratio for given son preference and gender selection technology. Assuming that "at least
one boy" is the preferred gender composition of children, parents can achieve their target
by manipulating fertility without resorting to gender selection technologies. For example,
if the total fertility rate is higher than 5 as in the pre-policy change period from 1949 to
1979, the probability of failing the preferred gender composition target is less than 2.5%. On
the contrary, a substantial percentage of parents are more likely to practice gender selection
when fertility is compressed to 1 or 2 by the one-child policy, and the probability of failing
to have "at least one boy" increases to 50% or 25%.
Given that both the Han Chinese and minority groups have exposure to a similar change
in gender selection technology, the di⁄erence in the change of sex ratios between the Han
Chinese and the minority group is thus ascribed to the di⁄erence in the change of fertility
induced by the di⁄erent one-child policy treatment. In addition, the sex ratios between the
Han and minorities were very close before the one-child policy. Therefore, our DD estimate
identi￿es the causal e⁄ect of the one-child policy on sex ratio conditional on son preference
and gender selection technology.
2.2 The One-Child Policy in China
After the termination of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the Chinese leadership was shocked
by the fact that while the grain production in 1977 stagnated at the level of 1955, the overall
population had almost doubled from 614 million in 1955 to 949 million in 1977.12 Thus, the
fear of a Malthusian catastrophe compelled the Communist leaders to take a radical birth
planning policy, the one-child policy, which began in the late 1970s. It is possibly the largest
12The cultivated area per capita shrank from 0.22 hectares in 1949 to 0.08 in 1977, far below the world
standard, in which about half of the acreage consisted of low-yield areas (Scharping, 2003).
6social experiment in human history.13 After its promulgation, however, the implementation
of the one-child policy has exhibited three distinctive features which may have brought
problems to the estimation of its demographic, social and economic e⁄ects.
First, instruments employed in the implementation of the one-child policy have exhibited
great diversi￿cations. They range from the mild methods of economic incentives and ￿nes,
propaganda and educational work, e⁄ective di⁄usion of contraceptives, and commitment and
subscription of the One-Child Certi￿cation, to extreme sanctions such as mandatory IUD
insertions, the refusal of water and electricity supplies, the unroo￿ng of peasant families￿
homes for violation, enforced abortion for above quota pregnancies, etc. (Scharping, 2003).
In practice, rather than a single policy, the one-child policy appears to be a set of policies.
The ￿ne for above quota birth is just one piece in the set of instruments. Moreover, the
adoptions and emphases of these policy instruments have varied from year to year, and from
region to region.
Second, there has been di⁄erent rigidity or ￿ exibility in implementing the one-child policy
across di⁄erent regions and di⁄erent years. Although the enforced one-child policy began as
early as in the late 1970s, the o¢ cial Population and Family Planning Law was enacted as
late as 2002. The implementation of the one-child policy had been through various executive
regulations and rules. Thus, both the central and local governments are given substantial
discretionary power to adjust the policy strictness in response to demographic, social, and
economic changes. For example, the release of the Central Document 7 in 1984 eased the
strictness of the one-child policy to a certain extent, and explicitly speci￿ed exceptional
conditions under which two children were allowed. Based on local conditions, families in
certain areas were allowed to have a second child if the ￿rst one was a girl after the release
of the Document. However, the central government late noted the laxity and a "loss of
control" in the Document, and called for strict adherence to population targets. Finally,
it was replaced by Central Document 13 issued in 1986, which is more stringent than the
13"The commitment to birth planning is the duty of citizens and the task of lower level administrations"
is even o¢ cially prescribed in the Chinese Constitution Law (article 49).
7previous stipulation (Peng, 1996; Scharping, 2003).
Finally and most importantly, the spatial and time variations may be endogenous to
sex ratios. These variations may re￿ ect the unobserved interaction between regional hetero-
geneities (e.g., son preference and socioeconomic development). The unobserved interaction
can also a⁄ect gender selection and sex ratios. Based on panel data from the China Health
and Nutrition Survey, Short and Zhai (1998) suggest that variations in the enforcement
strictness of the one-child policy have been based on local demographic, social, and eco-
nomic conditions. Li and Zhang (2008) ￿nd that the level of the ￿ne increases with the
community wealth level and the local government￿ s birth control incentives, but decreases
with the local government￿ s revenue incentives. In particular, the spatial and time variations
in the one-child policy have been documented as being a⁄ected by the fertility rate. As
discussed above, the central government explicitly tightened up the one-child policy in 1986
in response to the high fertility resulted by the Central Document 7 in 1984. Since fertility
a⁄ects both sex ratio and government policy, every factor that a⁄ects fertility would likely
a⁄ect sex ratio and the strictness of the one-child policy simultaneously.14
In summary, the instrument-, time-, and region-varying natures of its implementation
listed above make the measurement and the identi￿cation of the causal e⁄ect of the one-child
policy on sex ratio imbalance extremely di¢ cult, especially at the national level. However,
there is a general rule with the one-child policy that minority women were normally allowed
to have at least two children until the end of the 1980s, which is clear-cut and uniform
across regions and years. The di⁄erential treatment across ethnic groups has been embodied
in all documents of birth planning policies, and has even been o¢ cially written into the
Law on Regional National Autonomy (Peng, 1996). Therefore, the di⁄erential treatment of
the one-child policy between the Han and other minorities serves as a precious and unique
14After the rural household responsibility system reform in the early 1980s, the central government actually
lost the ability to directly control peasant income, land use, and collective welfare funds. Hence, a uniform
prescription of economic incentives or sanctions, and other implementing methods at the national level were
not exercisable for the central government. The central government only set the general rule for the one-
child policy, while its interpretation, adoption, and implementation were based on local conditions and needs
(Peng, 1996).
8quasi-experiment to identify the causality between the one-child policy and the increase in
sex ratios in China.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data Description
3.1 Empirical Strategy
This paper is interested in estimating the e⁄ect of the one-child policy on sex ratios. However,
sex ratios cannot be de￿ned at the individual level. Therefore, we will ￿rst estimate the policy
e⁄ect on the probability of being a boy at the individual level. We then translate it into
the policy e⁄ect on sex ratios at the population level by a nonlinear transformation. As
discussed in previous sections, the di⁄erential treatment of the one-child policy between the
Han and other minorities serves as a quasi-experiment to identify the causal e⁄ect on the sex
ratio imbalance. Since the one-child policy has only been applied to the Han, we have the
Han Chinese as the treatment group and the ethnic minorities as the comparison group. Let
Si be a child￿ s gender status; Si = 1 if the child is a boy, otherwise 0. In addition, let H and
T be the ethnic and birth cohort indicators, respectively; H equals 1 for a Han child, and T
equals 1 if the child was born in the post-policy change period (after 1979).15 Therefore, we
have four groups: Han Chinese born before 1979, Han Chinese born after 1979, minorities
born before 1979, and minorities born after 1979. The average probabilities of being a boy
for the four groups can be denoted as
Han Minority
Born before 1979 E(SijH = 1;T = 0) E(SijH = 0;T = 0)
Born after 1979 E(SijH = 1;T = 1) E(SijH = 0;T = 1)
15Before the implementation of the one-child policy in 1979, the Chinese government had initiated a
voluntary "late, long, few" policy which called for later childbearing, greater spacing between children
(normally four years), and fewer children since 1972. Thus, the one-child policy may impose an unexpected
constraint even for birth cohorts 1976-1978. However, parent who had given birth to a girl in, say, 1977,
could not anticipate the enforcement of the one-child policy in 1979. Thus, they had no incentive to practice
gender selection and thought they could give birth to another child four years later. In this case, it is the
expected fertility rather than actual fertility that has a⁄ected parent￿ s gender selection behavior. Therefore,
it is appropriate to treat the birth cohort before 1980 as the pre-policy change group in estimating the e⁄ect
of the one-child policy on sex ratio imbalance.
9We use the following DD framework to control for systematic di⁄erences across both
ethnic groups and birth cohorts. Di⁄erencing the mean value of Si across birth cohorts and
ethnic groups gives
DD = [E(SijH = 1;T = 1) ￿ E(SijH = 1;T = 0)] ￿
[E(SijH = 0;T = 1) ￿ E(SijH = 0;T = 1)] (1)
In the equation above, our estimated DD captures the causal e⁄ect of the one-child policy
on the sex ratio imbalance. Speci￿cally, the time-invariant and ethnic-speci￿c factors are
cleared out in the two di⁄erences of E(SijH = 1;T = 1) ￿ E(SijH = 1;T = 0) and
E(SijH = 0;T = 1) ￿ E(SijH = 0;T = 1), respectively. Then in the second step, any
changes not due to the intervention of the one-child policy, while common to both the Han
and other minorities are eliminated in the di⁄erence of ￿E(SijH = 1) ￿ ￿E(SijH = 0). In
other words, our DD estimate has netting out the e⁄ect of socioeconomic development, and
it only re￿ ects the e⁄ect of the one-child policy.
In practice, the following regression-adjusted DD model is used to identify the e⁄ect of
the one-child policy on the probability of being a boy
Si = ￿0 + ￿1Hi + ￿2Ti + ￿3(Hi ￿ Ti) + "i (2)
where the two dummy variables, Hi and Ti, pick up the ethnic and time e⁄ects, respectively.
For example, the e⁄ect of socioeconomic development on the probability of being a boy is
re￿ ected by ￿2. The coe¢ cient of our interest is on the interactive term of Hi ￿ Ti, which
captures the causal e⁄ect of the one-child policy on the gender of a Han child who was born
after 1979. In fact, ￿3 is identical to our DD in Equation (1). To see it clearly, we plug the
dummy variables into Equation (2) above, and then the average probabilities of being a boy
for the four groups are
10Han Minority Di⁄erence
Before 1979 ￿0 + ￿1 ￿0 ￿1
After 1979 ￿0 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 ￿0 + ￿2 ￿1 + ￿3
Di⁄erence ￿2 + ￿3 ￿2 ￿3
.
Thus, the policy e⁄ect on the probability of being a boy is [(￿0+￿1+￿2+￿3)￿(￿0+￿1)]￿
[(￿0 + ￿2) ￿ ￿0] = ￿3:
Using the estimates in Equation (2), we are able to derive the policy e⁄ect on sex ratios.
Speci￿cally, the ratio of males over females for the four groups are as follows,
Han Minority
Before 1979 (￿0 + ￿1)=[1 ￿ (￿0 + ￿1)] ￿0=(1 ￿ ￿0)
After 1979 (￿0 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3)=[1 ￿ (￿0 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3)] (￿0 + ￿2)=[1 ￿ (￿0 + ￿2)]
.
Thus, the policy e⁄ect on sex ratio (PESR) can be calculated as
PESR = 100 ￿ ff(￿0 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3)=[1 ￿ (￿0 + ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3)] ￿ (￿0 + ￿1)=[1 ￿ (￿0 + ￿1)]g
￿f(￿0 + ￿2)=[1 ￿ (￿0 + ￿2)] ￿ ￿0=(1 ￿ ￿0)gg: (3)
We multiply 100 on the right hand side of Equation (3) above because that the sex ratio is
de￿ned as the number of males per 100 females in the population. Furthermore, we are able
to statistically test the policy e⁄ect on sex ratios by using the estimates in Equation (2) with
the null hypothesis PESR = 0. It can be test by using a Wald-type non-linear test, which
is based on the delta method. Finally, we can ￿gure out the percentage of the increase in
sex ratios which is due to the one-child policy (POCP) for the Han Chinese as
POCP = PESR=f(￿0+￿1+￿2+￿3)=[1￿(￿0+￿1+￿2+￿3)]￿(￿0+￿1)=[1￿(￿0+￿1)]g; (4)
where f(￿0 +￿1 +￿2 +￿3)=[1￿(￿0 +￿1 +￿2 +￿3)]￿(￿0 +￿1)=[1￿(￿0 +￿1)]g is the total
increase in sex ratios for the Han Chinese, and PESR is the part attributed to the one-child
11policy.
Using the regression framework, we are able to control for other demographic, geographic,
and socioeconomic characteristics,
Si = ￿0 + ￿1Hi + ￿2Ti + ￿3(Hi ￿ Ti) + X
0
i￿ + "i (5)
where Xi is a vector of control variables.16 Our empirical results experience very mild change
when we include Xi as shown in the next section.
The key identifying assumption of the DD estimator is that the coe¢ cient on the inter-
action term of Hi ￿ Ti in Equation (2) should be zero in the absence of the one-child policy
(Angrist & Krueger, 1999). In other words, minorities should be a suitable comparison group
for the Han in identifying the treatment e⁄ect of the one-child policy on sex ratio imbalance
in China (Meyer, 1995). The validity of our DD estimator will be extensively discussed here
and will be systematically tested in next sections.
First, the possibility of an endogenously di⁄erential treatment of the one-child policy
between the Han and other minorities can be safely excluded.17 From the early documents
on the motivation of the one-child policy, the decision of the non-treatment on minorities
was driven by pure political considerations rather than by di⁄erent fertility rates or sex
ratios across ethnic groups (Greenhalgh, 2003). Hence, the threats of political economy and
selection problems to the validity of a DD estimator discussed in Meyer (1995) can be ignored
in our estimation.
Second, to illustrate the comparability of sex ratios across ethnic groups, Figure 2 depicts
sex ratios for the Han and other minorities by birth year. It is important to observe that the
16Since the dependent variable is a dummy, a logit model would seem to be a natural choice. However,
a linear probability model facilitates the interpretation of our DD estimates as shown above. Furthermore,
because all explanatory variables in our regression equation are dummies for mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive categories, the model is saturated. The linear probability model is thus general because the ￿tted
probability is simply the average within each cell de￿ned by di⁄erent values of Hi, Ti, and Xi. They are
all dummy variables. We need not worry about ￿tted probabilities falling out the unit interval (Wooldridge,
2002). Moreover, the major results in our paper are con￿rmed when we use a logit model.
17Besley and Case (2000) address the endogeneity in the implementation of policies in natural experiment
studies.
12time series pattern of sex ratios of minorities closely followed that of the Han Chinese￿ s during
the whole pre-policy change period from 1949 to the late 1970s. This situation substantially
favors our empirical design because the comparison group of minorities has a distribution of
outcomes very close to that of the treatment group of the Han Chinese during the pre-policy
change period (Meyer, 1995).
Third, a common identifying assumption in a quasi-experiment design is the absence
of omitted interactions. In other words, there are no omitted variables that changed the
outcomes between treatment and comparison groups in di⁄erent ways during the post-policy
change period (Meyer, 1995). Fortunately, several features of our empirical design facilitate
robust tests of the validity of this assumption in our DD estimates. We test and discuss the
robustness of our DD estimates extensively in Section 7.
3.2 Data Description
The 1% sample of the 1990 Chinese population census, which is the fourth census conducted
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), is employed to implement the DD estimation
discussed above. There are several reasons for using the data from the 1990 census. First
of all, to evaluate the e⁄ect of the one-child policy on sex ratios at the national level,
the advantage of using census data is self-evident compared to other survey data which are
conducted at the provincial level, or even at the county level. Second, in contrast to the third
population census in 1982, the 1990 census allows an appropriately lagged length of time for
the evaluation of the policy e⁄ect, because 10 years had already passed after the enactment
of the one-child policy in 1979. Third, before the 1990s, the household registration (Hukou)
system in China was still strictly regulated, and thus there was little household mobility.
Hence, the registration type (agricultural vs. non-agricultural Hukou) and other geographic
information were very likely to remain unchanged.
Our empirical analysis is mainly conducted on two subsamples drawn from the 1990
census data set. Sample 1 includes all children born after 1972 with ethnic, gender, age,
13registration type, and geographic information.18 Sample 2 restricts Sample 1 to those children
satisfying the following conditions: (i) sons or daughters of the household head; (ii) with
complete information about the mother, father, and siblings; (iii) mother￿ s age ranges from
20 to 38.19
Table 1 gives variable de￿nitions and summary statistics for two subsamples. Gender,
Han, Rural, and Treat are four dummy variables indicating the sex, ethnic identity, household
registration type, and birth cohort of the child surveyed. If the child is a Han boy with the
agricultural Hukou, and was born after 1979, then the values of these four variables are all
equal to one. In fact, there is another variable describing the household￿ s location type,
i.e., city, town, or village, in the 1990 census. However, since the registration type, Hukou,
and the location type are highly correlated (the correlation coe¢ cient is 0.97), only the
household registration type is chosen to indicate the geographic characteristic of the child.
Another reason for choosing the registration type is that the di⁄erential treatment of the
one-child policy for households is based on registration type, and not on location type.20
The education levels of parents are classi￿ed into four categories: illiterate or semi-literate,
primary school, junior high school, and senior high school or higher education.21 Finally, the
variable of Family size denotes the number of siblings of the child surveyed plus one, which
amounts to the number of children of the household head.
The mean value of Gender in Sample 1, which is considered as the benchmark in the
18The reason that the birth year is truncated at 1972 is that children born in 1973 were just 17 years old
in the census year of 1990. Since 18 is the legal minimum age for full-time work in China, most children
younger than 18 are still economically dependent on and living with their parents.
19Because the census contains no information on children no longer living at home, excluding those
households with children living outside home will result in a biased sample. Following Angrist and Evans
(1998), we restrict mother￿ s age to less than or equal to 38 to mitigate sample selection problem. Because
the minimum age for marriage as prescribed by the Chinese Marriage Law is 20, the age cuto⁄ is 17 for the
eldest children of these women, and most of these children are still living with their parents.
20Considering the high correlation between the agricultural Hukou and the geographic location in rural
areas, the interpretation of the variable Rural in the following part of the paper is exchangeable with the
agricultural Hukou.
21There is a total of seven education levels in the 1990 census: Illiterate and semi-literate, primary school,
junior high school, senior high school, technical school, junior college, and university or above. Since the
sample size for senior high school and above is small, these four higher levels of education are grouped into
one category: senior high school or higher education.
14empirical analysis, is 0.5196. It implies that the mean value of sex ratios is 108.2, which is
higher than the biologically stable range of 104-107. As far as other variables are concerned,
of those children in Sample 1, 90.29% are Han Chinese, 84.09% with the agricultural Hukou,
and 60.55% born in the post-policy change period. Compared to Sample 1, the mean value
of Gender in Sample 2 is 0.5235, which implies that the mean value of the sex ratio is 109.9.
The reason for this higher mean value of Gender in Sample 2 results from the higher mean
value of Treat. In contrast to the fact that 60.55% of the children were born in the post-
policy change period in Sample 1, the mean value of Treat in Sample 2 is 0.8053. It means
that there is a higher proportion of children born in the post-policy change period in Sample
2 than in Sample 1. Since the sex ratio in the post-policy change period is higher than that
in the pre-policy change period, the mean value of Gender is relatively higher in Sample
2. Table 1 also shows that mothers have an inferior educational attainment than fathers.
Contrasting mothers and fathers, only 6.17% of surveyed children￿ s fathers are illiterate or
semi-literate, while there is as high as 23.27% of mothers falling into this category. Finally,
the additional variable of Family size in Sample 2 indicates that each child has 1.26 siblings
on the average in a household.
4 Empirical Results
This section systematically examines the e⁄ect of the one-child policy on the increase in
sex ratios in the 1980s. We carry out the DD estimation of Equation (2) without and with
the control vector of geographic indicators. Before presenting our DD estimates, Figure 2
plots sex ratios for the Han and minorities by birth cohort. While the sex ratio shows no
systematical di⁄erence across ethnic groups before 1979, it is signi￿cantly and consistently
higher for the Han Chinese throughout 1980s. In fact, the sex ratio gap across ethnic groups
was on the average 0.73 (with a standard deviation of 2.08) in the pre-policy change period
from 1950 to 1979, and rose to 4.75 (with a standard deviation of 1.51) in the post-policy
change period.
15Using Sample 1, Table 2 reports the DD estimates of the treatment e⁄ect of the one-
child policy on the gender of the child by birth cohort. We report the mean value of gender
for cohorts born in the pre-policy change period in row 1, and the mean value of gender
for each cohort born in the post-policy change period in the rows below. In the last row,
we report the average treatment e⁄ect of the one-child policy during the entire post-policy
change period. In terms of columns, columns (1)-(2) report the mean value of gender for
Han and other minorities respectively, and column (3) reports the di⁄erence between the
two groups. Column (4) reports the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences (Equation (1)), which equals
column (3) minus the mean di⁄erence in gender during the pre-policy change period.
Consistent with Figure 2, Table 2 shows little di⁄erence between Han and other minorities
in the gender during the whole pre-policy change period. The magnitude of the di⁄erence
is close to zero, and is statistically insigni￿cant. In contrast, the di⁄erence is as large as
0.011 for the whole post-policy change period, and is statistically signi￿cant at 1%. It means
that the sex ratio of Han is on the average 4.7 higher than that of minorities during the
entire post-policy change period.22 Moreover, the di⁄erence is consistently positive and
mostly signi￿cant for each cohort born in the post-policy change period. Finally, column (4)
shows that the DD estimates for all birth cohorts are all positive and mostly signi￿cant at
conventional levels. The DD estimate for the entire post-treatment period, presented in the
last row of column (4), is 0.0106 and is statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level.
Columns (5)-(6) report the DD estimates by including the provincial and rural indica-
tors as control variables. Interestingly, we ￿nd that the DD estimates after controlling for
provincial and rural indicators are quite close to the estimates without controlling for them
(column (4)). It suggests that geographic characteristics are not important determinants of
the change in the Han-minority sex ratio gap. The last row of columns (5)-(6) shows that
the average treatment e⁄ect on the probability of being a boy is 0.0101. It implies that the
22The di⁄erence in sex ratios between the Han and other minorities in the post-policy change period is
given by 100￿[0:5234=(1￿0:5234)￿0:5124=(1￿0:5124)], which equals 4.7 (note that 0.5234 and 0.5124 are
from the last row of columns (1) and (2) in Table 2).
16one-child policy has increased the sex ratio by 4.4, and 93.62% of the rise in sex ratios for
the Han Chinese throughout the 1980s can be accounted for by employing Equations (3)-(4).
Using a Wald-type non-linear test as discussed in Subsection 3.1 above, we ￿nd the policy
e⁄ect on sex ratio is statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level.
5 The E⁄ect of the One-Child Policy by Birth Order
This section conducts the DD estimation by birth order. Based on Sample 2 with complete
siblings￿information, columns labeled as DD (1) at the ￿rst panel of Table 3 report our DD
estimates by birth order without other control variables. We ￿nd that the magnitude of the
DD estimate on the ￿rst birth parity is very small and is statistically insigni￿cant. However,
the DD estimate of the one-child policy is tripled for the second birth parity, and becomes
marginally signi￿cant at the 10% level. Moreover, the DD estimate on the third and higher
birth parities is as large as 0.0252, which is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. Columns
labeled as DD (2) at the ￿rst panel of Table 3 report DD estimates by birth order with
other control variables. The control variables are rural, mother and father￿ s education level,
and provincial indicators. We ￿nd that the DD estimates by birth parity is robust to the
inclusion of these control variables, and the DD estimate on the second birth parity even
becomes statistically signi￿cant. Therefore, the estimated e⁄ect of the one-child policy in
Table 2 is mainly re￿ ected at the second and higher birth parities.
The variation pattern of our DD estimates across di⁄erent birth parities is consistent
with the one-child policy explanation of the increase in sex ratios. With the regulated birth
quota of the one-child policy, the distortion of the sex ratio could be focused on the second
and higher birth parities. The reason is that the required payment for the "above-quota"
birth acts like a screener. Those parents risking the sanction to give a second or third birth
should have stronger son preference than those who had only one child on average, and
they are more likely to practice gender-selective abortion. Furthermore, the imposition of
the above-quota birth sanction has indeed increased the probability of choosing the gender
17selection technology and practicing gender-selective abortion on the second and higher birth
parity even in a homogenous case.23
The second panel of Table 3 reports the DD estimates by both family size and birth
order. It is interesting to note that the DD estimates exhibit a signi￿cant variation across
family size and birth order. The DD estimate is positive and statistically signi￿cant for
the second birth parity, while it is insigni￿cantly negative for the ￿rst birth parity in two
children families. If the family size is larger than two, the DD estimates are negative for the
￿rst two lower parities and positive for other higher parities. We further carry out the DD
estimation by both birth order and gender composition of elder siblings in the third panel of
Table 3. It is found that the DD estimate is only signi￿cant for those children born in the
second parity with an elder sister and in higher birth parities with two elder sisters.
Caution is needed in interpreting the DD estimates in Table 3 because fertility (family
size) is a choice variable. Therefore, we should look at the variation pattern of the DD
estimates by birth order, family size, and gender composition of elder siblings rather than
the DD estimate for a certain group of children. Summarizing from Table 3, we conclude
that parents subject to the one-child policy are more likely to practice gender selection at
the second or higher birth parities, especially when the ￿rst child is a girl or children at low
birth parities are all girls.
23A simple calculation will make it clear. Since the increase of sex ratios is mainly driven by the rural
subsample which will be demonstrated in the next section, and rural families could give birth to a second
child if the ￿rst is a girl, parents in rural areas would be less likely to practice gender selection behavior
on the ￿rst birth. However, if the second conception is a female, the parents would face the choice either
practicing gender selective abortion or carrying the conception to term and then having a third child. Assume
the bene￿t from giving a birth to a son is ￿, the cost of practicing gender selection is c, and the monetary
sanction of an addition above-quota birth is f. For simplicity, we further assume that gender selection
technology is perfect, rearing cost of the boy equals to the girl and it is normalized to zero, and the bene￿t
of giving birth to a girl is also normalized to zero. Thus, if the conception is a female, the probability of
choosing the gender selection technology is given by P = P(￿ ￿c > 1
2￿ ￿f), which is an increasing function
of f. It means that, for given son preference and gender selection technology, the probability of practicing
gender selection such as selective abortion at the second and higher birth parities is increasing with the
decrease in fertility which is caused by the one-child policy.
186 The E⁄ect of the One-Child Policy by Registration Type
It is interesting to know how the policy e⁄ect on sex ratio has operated on di⁄erent groups
with di⁄erent registration types. Although the one-child policy has been more strictly im-
plemented in urban areas (Peng, 1996; Zhang and Spence, 1992), the sex ratio in rural areas
may be more responsive to the one-child policy. On the one hand, the demand for sons is
stronger in rural areas than in urban areas. For example, the agricultural work in rural areas
is more labor intensive. The lack of retirement pensions in rural areas compels parents to
have a son to avoid a miserable life in their old age. The Confucian tradition is stronger
in rural areas because urban residents are more open-minded, and the continuation of the
family￿ s name is still considered as one of the most important responsibilities to predecessors
in rural areas. On the other hand, the magnitude of the decrease of the total fertility rate is
much bigger in rural areas than in urban areas after the introduction of the one-child policy.
Since the e⁄ect of one-child policy on the increase in sex ratios is through the decrease of
fertility and gender selection as discussed above, the policy e⁄ect on the sex ratio should be
larger in rural areas than in urban areas. For example, while the total fertility rate in urban
areas only decreased by 20% from 2.62 to 2.10 during the period of 1972-1990, it decreased
by 46% from 5.83 to 3.12 in rural areas during the same period (NBS, 2002).
Another objective in estimating the treatment e⁄ect by registration type is to test the
hypothesis of the rural household responsibility system reform. It has been suggested that
the increase in sex ratios is associated with the economic reform in China, which may have
changed the gender wage gap. One of the biggest policy reforms in the entire 1980s was
the introduction of the rural household responsibility system. Moreover, it has been demon-
strated that the adoption of this institutional reform had a signi￿cant impact on fertility
behavior in rural China (Schultz & Zeng, 1999).
During the same time, although no o¢ cial document can be found to support di⁄erent
treatments of this institutional reform by ethnic groups, it is suggested that the timing of the
adoption may depend on regional development levels (Lin, 1988). Since ethnic minorities,
19on the average, live in less developed regions in China, the timing of the adoption may be
correlated with the distribution of minority residents. However, if our DD estimate is mainly
picking up the e⁄ect of this factor, we would expect that the estimated policy e⁄ect should
be insigni￿cant in the rural subsample in the late 1980s, because almost all rural areas had
adopted this system by 1988 (Lin, 1997).
Table 4 con￿rms the di⁄erential treatment e⁄ects of the one-child policy on the sex ratio
imbalance for di⁄erent groups of registration type, in which the same DD model has been
implemented by using the rural and urban subsamples, respectively. Column (1) reports
the DD estimates of the rural subsample. Consistent with the DD estimates in Table 2 for
the whole sample, the DD estimates of the rural subsample are consistently positive at the
signi￿cant level of 10% except for the birth cohort of 1982. In addition, after the inclusion
of provincial indicators in column (2), our DD estimates are still signi￿cantly positive for
most of birth cohorts.
In contrast to the rural subsample, columns (3)-(4) show that the DD estimates of the
urban subsample are all insigni￿cant at conventional levels except for the birth cohort of
1982. Moreover, the signs of the DD estimates in the urban sample are inconsistent across
birth cohorts, and more than half of the DD estimates across birth cohorts are negative,
though they are not statistically signi￿cant. In summary, the di⁄erential treatment e⁄ects on
di⁄erent subsamples suggest that the estimated e⁄ect of the one-child policy on the sex ratio
imbalance in the whole sample of Table 2 is mainly driven by the rural subsample, because
84.09% of the children lived in rural areas. In addition, since the estimated treatment e⁄ects
of the rural subsample are still highly signi￿cant for those birth cohorts in the late 1980s
when almost all of the Chinese rural areas had adopted the household responsibility system,
our DD estimates are not likely to be confounded by this institutional reform in rural areas.24
24Considering di⁄erent sample sizes between rural and urban subsamples, we have applied the bootstrap
method to generate standard errors and t-statistics in the rural subsample of Table 6. The results are very
similar. The table with bootstrapped t-statistics are available upon request.
207 Robust Analysis
Although the previous analysis has identi￿ed the one-child policy as the main culprit for the
increase in sex ratios in China, we need to ensure that our DD estimates are not mainly
picking up the e⁄ect of other omitted policy shocks or socioeconomic changes. This section
carries out the robust analysis. We ￿rst conduct the DD estimations for alternative depen-
dent variables; we then analyze the time pattern of the DD estimates by birth year; ￿nally,
we carry out the DD estimation by provinces and autonomous regions, respectively.
7.1 The DD Estimates for Other Outcome Variables
The key identi￿cation assumption of the DD estimator is that there should no other policy
shocks or changes in socioeconomic variables during the post-treatment period that have
a⁄ected the gender selection behavior of the Han and minorities di⁄erently. Although we
do not know any such kind of unobservable shocks or changes a priori, the validity of our
DD identi￿cation can be justi￿ed as follows. If the DD estimate on the sex ratio is due
to something other than the one-child policy (e.g. the economic reform which might have
a⁄ected the Han and minorities di⁄erently), the impact should also manifest on other aspects.
Thus, we also provide the DD estimate for other outcome variables covering family structure,
mother￿ s age at the ￿rst birth, parental education and labor market behaviors. To validate
our DD identi￿cation, we expect that the DD estimates for these variables would be zero.
Table 5 reports the DD estimates for other outcome variables. It is reassuring to ￿nd
that all DD estimates are statistically insigni￿cant except for mother￿ s education in the
rural sample.25 Considering the huge sample size, we conclude that there is no di⁄erence in
changes between the Han and minorities in terms of family structure, mother￿ s age at the ￿rst
birth, father￿ s education, and parental labor market behaviors. As for mother￿ s education,
it is noted that the estimated coe¢ cient is small. In addition, the literature suggests that
the increase of mother￿ s education, relative to father￿ s, enhances mother￿ s bargaining power
25As discussed in the previous section, the e⁄ect of the one-child policy on sex ratio imbalance mainly
happened in rural areas. Thus, we focus on the rural sample.
21within the household, and thus leads to a weakened preference for boys (Thomas, 1994;
Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002). Therefore, the fact that mother￿ s education increases
more for the Han than minorities would bias downward our DD estimates of the e⁄ect of
one-child policy, if any. In other words, the DD estimate of the one-child policy on the sex
ratio would have been larger without the increased female education of the Han relative to
the minorities.
7.2 The Time Pattern of the DD estimates by Birth Year
This section systematically examines the time pattern of the DD estimates in the post-policy
change period which is used to distinguish the one-child policy story from other competing
hypotheses. As we have discussed earlier, the multiple pre- and post-policy change periods
of our data set provide an opportunity to check the robustness of our quasi-experiment
design (Meyer, 1995). We have discussed the co-movement of sex ratios across ethnic groups
during the entire pre-policy change period in Subsection 3.1, which strongly establishes the
comparability between the Han and other minorities.
It has been suggested that the spread of modern gender selection technologies, such as
ultrasound B machines, may be responsible for the increase in sex ratios in China (Das
Gupta, 2005; Gulmoto, 2009; Zeng et al., 1993). However, considering the fact that both the
Han Chinese and minorities have exposure to a similar change in gender selection technology,
our DD estimates are conditional on the spread of modern gender selection technologies. In
addition, even if the distribution of ultrasound B machines was unbalanced across ethnic
groups, and our DD estimates was confounded with this unbalanced distribution, we could
expect a dynamically converging time pattern of the DD estimates during the post-policy
change period.
Considering that the scan fee was relatively expensive for residents living in rural and
remote areas in the early 1980s, ultrasound B machines were likely to have been ￿rst intro-
duced to relatively wealthier regions, such as big cities, and eastern and coastal areas, where
the majority of residents are Han. Thus, the Han Chinese may have had access to ultra-
22sound B machines earlier. However, the di⁄erence in the probability of access to this modern
machine across ethnic groups should have been decreasing, because China had begun the
introduction of ultrasound B machines on a large scale in 1982, and reached the peak of the
importation of this machine during the period 1985-1989. In addition, China had produced
over 10,000 ultrasound B machines per year in the late 1980s, which means there would have
been about four machines in each county, and each county had actually been equipped with
machines operated by pro￿cient technicians by then (Zeng et al., 1993).
Figure 3 plots the time pattern of our DD estimates by birth year for the entire post-
treatment period, in which DD1, DD2, and DD3 refer to the DD estimates in columns (4)-(6)
in Table 2, respectively. Contradicting the ultrasound B hypothesis, the dynamic pattern of
the estimated e⁄ect does not show any converging trend.
In addition, if our DD estimates in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 are mainly driven by
di⁄erent timings of accessing to ultrasound B machines between the Han and minorities,
the time pattern of the di⁄erences between columns (4) and (5)-(6) should also exhibit a
converging trend. Under the ultrasound B machine story, the geographic location, which
determines the probability of access to the machine between the Han and other minorities, is
assumed to be the driving force underlying our DD estimates. Thus, the di⁄erence between
our DD estimates without and with controlling for geographic location should be bigger in
the early 1980s when ultrasound B machines were ￿rst available for the Han who mainly
lived in eastern and coastal areas. These di⁄erences should be smaller when ultrasound B
machines were widespread and the di⁄erence in accessing them between the Han and other
minorities decreased in the late 1980s.
Figure 4 plots the dynamic pattern of the di⁄erence of our DD estimates without and
with geographic indicators by birth year. Contrary to the prediction by the ultrasound
B machine story, the di⁄erences between columns (4) and (5)-(6) in Table 2 exhibit no
converging pattern at all.
In contrast to the ultrasound B machine story, the time patterns of both the DD estimates
23in Figure 3 and the di⁄erences of the DD estimates in Figure 4 are exactly consistent with
the implementation stages and a¢ rmativeness of the one-child policy in the 1980s. First, the
rough "U" shape of the time pattern of the DD estimates for the entire 1980s just re￿ ects
the fact that the one-child policy was strict in the earlier 1980s; then the enactment of
Central Document 7 relaxed the strictness of the one-child policy to a certain extent in 1984;
and ￿nally began to tighten it up in the late 1980s (Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister, 1988;
Scharping, 2003; Yang & Chen, 2004).
Second, the time pattern of our DD estimates is surprisingly consistent with Scharping￿ s
(2003) classi￿cation of the stages of the one-child policy. In Scharping (2003), the entire
post-policy change period is classi￿ed into four phases: Drums and gongs (the campaign
from 1979 to 1983); small holes and big gaps (the relaxation from 1984 to 1985); tit for tat
(the controversy from 1986 to 1989); and law and order (the administration from 1990 to
1999). It is interesting to ￿nd that the ￿rst three stages are clear in the time pattern of our
DD estimates in Figure 3.26 In addition, the three biggest in￿ exion changes in Figure 4 just
correspond to the three biggest policy changes in 1982, 1984, and 1986 respectively.27
Third, the relatively mild di⁄erences of the DD estimates between columns (4) and (5)-
(6) in the ￿rst half of the 1980s (Figure 4) re￿ ect the fact that the one-child policy was
almost uniformly implemented across the nation, and that little di⁄erence was allowed across
provinces and between rural and urban areas in its early stage. After the strong resistance
encountered during the initial policy implementation process, especially in rural areas, the
central government then began to allow di⁄erences across provinces, and had made a clear
distinction between rural and urban areas in 1986 (Peng, 1996). In 1988, Peng Peiyun, then
head of the National Family Planning Commission, admitted that the adoption of a uniform
policy guideline was impossible across the whole country. Therefore, the inclusion of the
26It should be noted that the policy e⁄ect may be roughly lagged for one year for pregnancy time.
27In December 1982, the commitment for birth planning was unprecedentedly written in the revised
Chinese Constitution Law, which decreed it as the citizens￿duty and the task of lower level administrations.
Considering the strong resistance encountered, Central Document 7 relaxed the rigid one-child policy in
1984. Then the resurgence of birth rates led to Central Document 13 issued in May 1986 calling for strict
adherence to population targets.
24geographic and rural indicators should have a⁄ected the magnitude of the DD estimates in
column (4) of Table 2 to a larger extent in the late 1980s.
Finally, comparing Figure 3 with Figure 4, we ￿nd that the two locally lowest DD es-
timates for birth cohorts of 1982 and 1986 in Figure 3 precisely correspond to two locally
highest points in Figure 4, respectively. It means that the variation of the one-child policy
across provinces and between rural and urban areas is bigger when the policy implementation
is weaker. This corresponds to the general practice in the implementation of the one-child
policy by the Chinese central government. When the rigid one-child policy was relaxed, the
Central Committee of the Family Planning allowed di⁄erent local formulas for incentives
and sanctions based on di⁄erent local conditions. However, when the Central Committee
decided to tighten up the policy, a stringently unitary campaign was promoted across the
nation (Scharping, 2003).
7.3 The Geographic Pattern of the DD Estimates by Provinces and Autonomous
Regions
We have examined the robustness of our DD estimates across time in previous subsections.
We now explore the geographic pattern of the DD estimates by provinces and autonomous
regions. In China, the percentage of minorities living in ￿ve autonomous regions to the whole
population of minorities is higher than 40%, and these autonomous regions are geograph-
ically located at the western and southern parts of China.28 There had been unbalanced
socioeconomic development across provinces and autonomous regions after the economic re-
form in the late 1970s. During the same time, the increase in sex ratios in China has been
suggested to be correlated with socioeconomic development (Qian, 2008). Therefore, the
bene￿t of estimating the treatment e⁄ect at the provincial or autonomous regional level is
that the Han and minorities should be more homogeneously a⁄ected by the economic reform
within the same area, and thus the interfering e⁄ect of socioeconomic development can be
28In the present paper, the 22 provinces and 4 municipalities in China are grouped together and all
are treated as provinces. The ￿ve autonomous regions are Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and
Xinjiang. The two Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao are excluded in our analysis.
25held constant or eliminated.
Table 6 reports our DD estimates by province and autonomous region in the upper panel,
and by each autonomous region in the lower panel. Columns (1)-(2) show that people living
in provinces constitute a dominant share of 91.15% of the total population, where 93.59% is
Han. Only 8.85% of the Chinese population live in the ￿ve autonomous regions, and almost
45% of the residents living there are minorities. Column (3) reports the DD estimates for
the provinces and autonomous regions. We ￿nd that both DD estimates are positive and
signi￿cant at a high level of 1%. Furthermore, column (4) shows that these two DD estimates
are robust to the inclusion of the rural indicator. The lower panel of Table 6 shows that
the estimated treatment e⁄ects are positive for the autonomous regions except Tibet. The
reason for the insigni￿cant DD estimate for Tibet may be due to the fact that, as shown in
column (2), there is only 0.35% of the children who are Han in Tibet (see column 2). Thus,
essentially, the one-child policy has been exempted for most people in Tibet. The negative
DD estimate for Tibet may actually re￿ ect a weakening son preference with socioeconomic
development. In summary, the geographic pattern in Table 6 further validates our quasi-
experiment design.
An interesting ￿nding is that the estimated treatment e⁄ect of the one-child policy is
bigger in autonomous regions than in provinces. A possible explanation may be that the
agricultural sector is the primary sector in these ￿ve regions. Hence, the gender gap of
labor productivity in autonomous regions is on the average higher than in the rest of China
because of the labor intensive nature of the agricultural work. A complementary explanation
comes from the fact that the Han Chinese living in autonomous regions may be subject to
a stricter one-child policy than their counterparts in provinces. Indeed, many of the Han
Chinese living in the autonomous regions are dispatched by the government and work in
the public sectors, and the one-child policy has been implemented more stringently in these
sectors (Peng, 1996).
In summary, our robust analysis indicates that the DD estimates of the one-child policy
26e⁄ect on sex ratio are unlikely to pick up the e⁄ects of other policy shocks or socioeconomic
changes, which may a⁄ect the gender selection behavior such as gender-selective abortion
between the Han and minorities di⁄erently.
8 DD Estimates Using the 2000 Census and the 2005 Mini-Census
This section presents the DD estimates using the 2000 census and the 2005 mini-census.
In China, the sex ratio at birth shows a dramatically increasing trend during 1990-2005.
Although the DD method requires birth cohorts to be near the implementation year of the
one-child policy, exploring the policy e⁄ect in the 1990s onwards is interesting. As in the
foregoing analysis, this section treats the 1973-1979 birth cohort in the 1990 census as the
group born prior to the one-child policy. In the 2000 census, we use the 1991-2000 birth
cohort as the group born in the 1990s. Similarly, we use the 2001-2005 birth cohort in the
2005 mini-census.
Table 7 reports the estimation results using the 2000 census and the 2005 mini-census,
respectively. Column (1) shows that compared with the birth cohort before 1980, the one-
child policy has increased the probability of being a boy by as large as 1.52 percentage points
in the 1990s. Using Equation (3), we calculate that the policy e⁄ect on sex ratios is about
6.98, which is statistically signi￿cant at 1% level. Using Equation (4), we ￿nd that the
e⁄ect of the one-child policy accounts for 57.12% of the total increase in sex ratios during
the 1990s. From columns (2)-(3), we ￿nd that the policy e⁄ect is robust to the inclusion of
provincial and rural dummies. Similarly, column (4) shows that the one-child policy increases
the probability of being a boy by 1.58 percentage points. This implies that the one-child
policy has increased the sex ratio by 7.01 in 2001-2005, accounting for 53.59% of the total
increase in sex ratios during the same period.
Table 8 summarizes the e⁄ects of the one-child policy on sex ratios across the 1990
census, the 2000 census, and the 2005 mini-census. Column (1) reports the actual sex ratios
at di⁄erent periods. Column (2) calculates the total increases in sex ratios for two adjacent
27periods. The estimated e⁄ects of the one-child policy on the sex ratio in di⁄erent periods
are reported in column (3). It is noted that the e⁄ect of one-child policy on sex ratios has
increased by 2.28 from the 1980s to the 1990s (i.e., 6.98-4.40), and then it leveled o⁄in 2001-
2005 (i.e., 7.01-6.98). The increase in the policy e⁄ect on sex ratios in the 1990s onwards
may be attributable to the 1.5-child policy, which was more prevalent after 1990. Zeng (2007,
2009) analyzes the structural impact and the implicit psychological e⁄ect induced by the 1.5-
child policy on sex ratios. For example, the 1.5-child policy suggests that the government
implicitly agrees that a girl￿ s value is half that of a boy. Such implicit psychological e⁄ects,
together with the traditional strong son preference, lead a rural resident whose ￿rst child is
a girl to conduct prenatal gender selection to have at least one boy.29
Columns (4) of Table 8 shows that the percentage of increase in sex ratios accounted for
by the one-child policy has substantially decreased from the 1980s to the 1990s. Although
the one-child policy accounted for a dominant share (94%) of the increase in sex ratios in
the 1980s, it only explained 57% and 54% of the increases in the 1990s and 2001-2005,
respectively. This implies that the continuing increase in sex ratios in the 1990s onwards is
mainly caused by other factors such as socioeconomic development rather than the one-child
policy.
As discussed above, given son preference and gender selection technology, the frequency
or intensity of gender selection is di⁄erent at di⁄erent fertility levels; thus, the sex ratio also
becomes di⁄erent. Speci￿cally, ceteris paribus, the sex ratio increases as fertility decreases.
Of course, lower fertility with desired gender (boys) in the population can only be realized
by resorting to gender selection at an earlier time or at a more intensi￿ed pace. Following
this logic, the steady increase in sex ratios after 1990 has been a result of the steady decrease
in fertility during the same period. The total fertility rate decreased from 2.46 in 1990 to
29Guo (2005) and Gu et al. (2008) have analyzed fertility rates and sex ratios across di⁄erent policy
regimes. It would be interesting to explore the causal e⁄ects of the 1-, 1.5-, and 2-child policies on sex ratios
among the Han Chinese. However, the 1-, 1.5-, and 2-child policies among the Han Chinese are suspected
to be endogenously imposed. In contrast, the di⁄erential treatment of the policy across ethnic groups is
evidently exogenously imposed.
281.80 in 2000. Therefore, any factor that has led to a decrease in fertility has also driven
up sex ratios. The one-child policy had played a major role in decreasing fertility in the
1980s; hence, it was the dominant driver of the increase in sex ratio during this period.
The importance of the one-child policy may have lessened in the decline of fertility rates
in the 1990s onwards, and correspondingly, its importance in increasing sex ratios may
have likewise decreased. The rapid economic growth in the 1990s, for example, increased
the private monetary and opportunity cost of childbearing. During the same time, the
emphasis on human capital pushed parents to invest more on their children￿ s education.
Therefore, socioeconomic development decreased fertility in the 1990s. Low fertility, strong
son preference, and the availability of modern gender selection technology lead parents to
practice gender selection or gender-selective abortion more likely.
9 Conclusion
Exploiting a unique feature of the one-child policy (i.e., it was only applied to the Han
Chinese), this paper has constructed a DD estimator to identify the causal relationship
between the one-child policy and the recent increase in sex ratios in China. Based on
the 1990 Chinese population census, the estimated e⁄ect of the one-child policy on the
probability of being a boy is as large as 1.01 percentage points in the 1980s. This implies
that the strict enforcement of the one-child policy has causally increased the sex ratio by
4.4, accounting for about 94% of the increase in sex ratios throughout the 1980s. Further
exploration reveals that the policy e⁄ect is mainly driven by second and higher birth parities,
and by rural residents. Moreover, several robust tests indicate that the DD estimates are not
likely confounded by other policy shocks or socioeconomic changes. We have also conducted
the DD estimation by using both the 2000 census and the 2005 mini-census. The estimates
imply that the one-child policy has increased the sex ratio by about 7.0 for the 1991-2005
birth cohort, accounting for about 57% and 54% of the increases in sex ratios for the 1990s
and 2001-2005 birth cohorts, respectively.
29References
[1] Angrist, J. (2002). How Do Sex Ratios A⁄ect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence
from America￿ s Second Generation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 997-1038.
[2] Angrist, J., & Evans, W. (1998). Children and Their Parent￿ s Labor Supply: Evidence
from Exogenous Variation in Family Size. American Economic Review, 88(3), 450-477.
[3] Angrist, J., & Krueger, A. (1999). Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics. In Orley
Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics. Volume 3A. Amster-
dam: North-Holland.
[4] Banister, J. (2004). Shortage of Girls in China Today. Journal of Population Research,
21(1), 19-45.
[5] Becker, G. S. (1991). A Treatise on the Family. Enlarged edition, Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press.
[6] Behrman, J. R., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (2002). Does Increasing Women￿ s Schooling Raise
the Schooling of the Next Generation? American Economic Review, 92(1), 323-334.
[7] Ben-Porath, Y., & Welch, F. (1976). Do Sex Preferences Really Matter? Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 90(2), 285-307.
[8] Besley, T., & Case, A. (2000). Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of
Endogenous Policies. Economic Journal, 110(467), 672-694.
[9] Blau, F. D., & Kahn, L. M. (1997). Swimming Upstream: Trends in the Gender Wage
Di⁄erential in the 1980s. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1), 1-42.
[10] Cai, F., Park, A., & Zhao, Y. (2008). The Chinese Labor Market. In Loren Brandt and
Thomas Rawski, eds., China￿ s Great Economic Transformation. London: Cambridge
University Press.
30[11] Chiappori, P.-A., Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G. (2002). Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation
and Household Labor Supply. Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37-72.
[12] Chu, J. (2001). Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural Central
China. Population and Development Review, 27(2), 259-281.
[13] Coale, A. J., & Banister, J. (1994). Five Decades of Missing Females in China. Demog-
raphy, 31(3), 459-479.
[14] Das Gupta, M. (2005). Explaining Asia￿ s "Missing Women": A New Look at the Data.
Population and Development Review, 31, 529-535.
[15] Dreze, J., & Khera, R. (2000). Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from
Homicide Data. Population and Development Review, 26(2), 335-352.
[16] Du￿ o, E. (2003). Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intra-
household Allocation in South Africa. World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 1-25.
[17] Ebenstein, A. Y. (2009). The "Missing Girls" of China and the Unintended Conse-
quences of the one-child Policy. Journal of Human Resources. Forthcoming.
[18] Edlund, L. (1999). Son Preference, Sex Ratios, and Marriage Patterns. Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 107(6), 1275-1304.
[19] Edlund, L., Li, H., Yi, J., & Zhang, J. (2008). Sex Ratio and Crime: Evidence from
China￿ s One-Child Policy. IZA Working Paper 3214.
[20] Foster, A. D., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (1999). Missing Women, the Marriage Market and
Economic Growth. Brown University Working Paper.
[21] Greenhalgh, S. (2003). Science, Modernity, and the Making of China￿ s One-Child Policy.
Population and Development Review, 29(2), 163-201.
31[22] Gu, B., Song, J., Liu, S., Wang, J., & Jiang, L. (2008). The Practice and Enlightenment
of the Two-Child Policy Regime (er hai sheng yu zheng ce di qu de shi jian ji qi shi).
Population Research (Ren Kou Yan Jiu), 32(4), 33-49.
[23] Guilmoto, C. Z. (2009). The Sex Ratio Transition in Asia. Population and Development
Review, 35(3), 519-549.
[24] Guo, Z. (2005). A Demographic Analysis According to the One-Child Policy Regimes
Based on the 2000 Population Census (2000 nian ren kou pu cha an sheng yu zheng ce
lei xing de ren kou fen xi). In A Report of a National Major Research Project for the
2000 Population Census (2000 nian ren kou pu cha guo jia zhong dian ke ti yan jiu bao
gao), edited by The Census O¢ ce of the Chinese State Council and National Bureau of
Statistics. China Statistics Press.
[25] Gustafsson, B., & Li, S. (2000). Economic Transformation in Urban China and the
Gender Earnings Gap. Journal of Population Economics, 13(2), 305-330.
[26] Hardee-Cleaveland, K., & Banister, J. (1988). Fertility Policy and Implementation in
China, 1986-88. Population and Development Review, 14(2), 245-286.
[27] Hesketh, T., Lu, L., & Xing, Z. W. (2005). The E⁄ect of China￿ s One-Child Family
Policy after 25 Years. New England Journal of Medicine, 353(11), 1171-1176.
[28] Hesketh, T., & Xing, Z. W. (2006). Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes
and Consequences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(36), 13271-
13275.
[29] Hudson, V. M., & Boer, A. D. (2002). A Surplus of Men, A De￿cit of Peace: Security
and Sex Ratios in Asia￿ s Largest States. International Security, 26(4), 5-38.
[30] Li, G. (2002). E⁄ects of the One-Child policy on the Number and Sex Composition of
Children in China. University of Washington Working Paper.
32[31] Li, H., & Zhang, J. (2009). Testing the External E⁄ect of Household Behavior: The
Case of the Demand for Children. Journal of Human Resources, 44(4), 890-915.
[32] Li, H., & Zhang, J. (2008). Fines, Limited Liability and Fertility. The Chinese University
of Hong Kong Working Paper.
[33] Li, H., & Zhang, J. (2007). Do High Birth Rates Hamper Economic Growth? Review of
Economics and Statistics, 89(1), 110-17.
[34] Lin, J. Y. (1988). The Household Responsibility System in China￿ s Agricultural Reform:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(3),
S199-224.
[35] Lin, J. Y. (1997). The Role of Agriculture in the Transition Process in China. In J. Kydd,
S. Davidson, M. Mackay and T. Mech, eds., The Role Agriculture in theTtransition
Toward a Market Economy. New York: United Nations.
[36] Lin, M. J., & Luoh, M. C. (2008). Can Hepatitis B Mothers Account for the Num-
ber of Missing Women? Evidence from Three Million Newborns in Taiwan. American
Economic Review, 98(5), 2259-2273.
[37] Meng, X. (1998). Male￿ Female Wage Determination and Gender Wage Discrimination
in China￿ s Rural Industrial Sector. Labour Economics, 5(1), 67-89.
[38] Meyer, B. D. (1995). Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics. Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics, 13(2), 151-161.
[39] National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 2002. Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census
of the People￿ s Republic of China [2000 nian ren kou pu cha tong ji zi liao hui bian].
Beijing: China Statistics Press.
[40] Oster, E. (2005). Hepatitis B and the Case of the Missing Women. Journal of Political
Economy, 113(6), 1163-1216.
33[41] Oster, E., & Chen, G. (2008). Hepatitis B Does Not Explain Male-Biased Sex Ratio in
China. NBER Working Paper 13971.
[42] Park, C. B., & Han, J. Q. (1990). A Minority Group and China￿ s One-Child Policy:
The Case of the Koreans. Studies in Family Planning, 21(3), 161-170.
[43] Peng, P. (ed.) (1996). Family Planning Encyclopedia of China [zhong guo ji hua sheng
yu quan shu]. Beijing: China Population Press.
[44] Porter, M. (2007). The E⁄ects of Sex Ratio Imbalance in China on Marriage and House-
hold Bargaining. University of Chicago Working Paper.
[45] Porter, M. (2008). How Marriage Market Conditions in China In￿ uence Intergradational
Transfers. University of Chicago Working Paper.
[46] Qian, N. (2008). Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The E⁄ect of Sex-
Speci￿c Earnings on Sex Imbalance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3).
[47] Rao, V. (1993). The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases
in Rural India. Journal of Political Economy, 101(4), 666.
[48] Rosenzweig, M. R., & Schultz, T. P. (1982). Market Opportunities, Genetic Endow-
ments, and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India. American
Economic Review, 72(4), 803-815.
[49] Rozelle, S., Dong, X., Zhang, L., & Mason, A. (2002). Gender Wage Gaps in Post-
Reform Rural China. Paci￿c Economic Review, 7(1), 157-179.
[50] Scharping, T. (2003). Birth Control in China, 1949-2000 : Population Policy and De-
mographic Development. London ; New York: Routledge.
[51] Schultz, T. P., & Zeng, Y. (1999). The Impact of Institutional Reform from 1979 through
1987 on Fertility in Rural China. China Economic Review, 10(2), 141-160.
34[52] Sen, A. (1990). More than 100 Million Women are Missing. New York Review of Books.
[53] Short, S. E., & Zhai, F. (1998). Looking Locally at China￿ s One-Child Policy. Studies
in Family Planning, 29(4), 373-374.
[54] Thomas, D. (1994). Like Father, Like Son; Like Mother, Like Daughter: Parental Re-
sources and Child Height. Journal of Human Resources, 29(4), 950-988.
[55] Tuljapurkar, S., Li, N., & Feldman, M. W. (1995). High Sex Ratios in China￿ s Future.
Science, 267(5199), 874-876.
[56] Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Mass:
MIT Press.
[57] Wei, S., & Zhang, X. (2008). Sex Ratio Imbalances Stimulate Savings Rates: Evidence
from the Missing Women in China. Columbia University Working Paper.
[58] Yang, D. T., & Chen, D. (2004). Transformations in China￿ s Population Policies and
Demographic Structure. Paci￿c Economic Review, 9(3), 269-290.
[59] Zeng., Y., Ping, T., Baochang, G., Yi, X., Bohua, L., & Yongping, L. (1993). Causes
and Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China.
Population and Development Review, 19(2), 283-302.
[60] Zeng, Y. (2007). Options for Fertility Policy Transition in China. Population and De-
velopment Review, 33(2), 215-246.
[61] Zeng, Y. (2009). Soft-landing of the Two-child plus Spacing Policy is Helpful to Resolve
the Problems of High Sex Ratio at Birth in China (er hai wan yu ruan zhe lu fang an
you li yu jie jue wo guo chu sheng xing bie bi pian gao wen ti). Social Science (she hui
ke xue), 8, 54-59.
[62] Zhang, J., & Spencer, B. (1992). Who Signs China￿ s One-Chid Certi￿cate, and Why?
Journal of Population Economics, 5, 203-215.
35[63] Zhang, J., Han, J., Liu, P., & Zhao, Y. (2008). Trends in the Gender Earnings Di⁄eren-




























































































Note: DD1 refers to DD estimates without any control variables (column 4 in Table 2); DD2 refers to DD estimates 
controlling for provincial indicators (column 5 in Table 2); DD3 refers to DD estimates controlling for both 









































Note: Difference 1 refers to the difference between the DD estimates without and with provincial indicators (the 
difference between columns 4 and 5 in Table 2); Difference 2 refers to the difference between the DD estimates 
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Note: The calculation is based on Table 1a in Zhang, J., Han, J., Liu, P., & Zhao, Y. (2008), Trends in the Gender 
Earnings Differential in Urban China, 1988-2004. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 61(2), 224-243.   40
 
Table 1: Variable definition and summary statistics 
   Sample 1  Sample 2 
Variables Definitions  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Gender  1: male; 0: female  0.5196   0.4996   0.5235   0.4994  
Han  1: Han; 0: national minorities  0.9030   0.2960  0.9094   0.2871  
Rural 1:  agricultural Hukou; 0: non-agricultural Hukou  0.8409   0.3658  0.8625   0.3443  
Treat  1: born after 1979; 0: otherwise  0.6055  0.4888  0.8053  0.3960 
        
Mother illiterate  1: illiterate or semi-literate; 0: otherwise      0.2327   0.4225  
Mother primary  1: primary school; 0: otherwise      0.4224   0.4934  
Mother junior  1: junior middle school; 0: otherwise      0.2529   0.4347  
Mother senior or higher  1: senior middle school or higher education levels; 0: otherwise      0.0920   0.2890  
        
Father illiterate  1: illiterate or semi-literate; 0: otherwise      0.0618   0.2407  
Father primary  1: primary school; 0: otherwise      0.3550   0.4785  
Father junior  1: junior middle school; 0: otherwise      0.4084   0.4915  
Father senior or higher  1: senior middle school or higher education levels; 0: otherwise      0.1748   0.3798  
        
Family size  The number of siblings plus 1 for the child surveyed      2.2647  1.0131 
        
Number of observations    3,856,489 1,880,322 
 
Note: Sample 1 includes all children aged from 0 to 17 in the Chinese population census in 1990 (1% sample) with age, gender, registration type and geographic location 
information. Sample 2 restricts Sample 1 to those children satisfying the following conditions: (i) sons or daughters of the household head; (ii) complete information of 
mother, father, and siblings; (iii) mother's age is ranging from 20 to 38.    41
 
Table 2: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the probability of being a boy 
Dependent variable: Gender 




(control provincial and rural 
indicators) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-policy change 
 period 
(N=1,521,563)           
            
1973-1979  0.5153  0.5149  0.0004  (0.0014)        
            
Post-policy change 
 period 
(N=2,334,926)           
            
1980  0.5197  0.5117  0.0080**  (0.0038) 0.0076* (0.0046) 0.0075* (0.0046) 0.0075* (0.0046) 
1981  0.5191  0.5023  0.0167*** (0.0037)  0.0163*** (0.0032)  0.0160*** (0.0032)  0.0160*** (0.0032) 
1982  0.5216  0.5131  0.0084**  (0.0035) 0.0080  (0.0064) 0.0076  (0.0064) 0.0075  (0.0064) 
1983  0.5240  0.5105  0.0135*** (0.0037)  0.0131*** (0.0041)  0.0127*** (0.0041)  0.0127*** (0.0041) 
1984  0.5213  0.5082  0.0131*** (0.0036)  0.0127*** (0.0042)  0.0124*** (0.0041)  0.0124*** (0.0041) 
1985  0.5198  0.5106  0.0092***  (0.0036) 0.0087**  (0.0039) 0.0086**  (0.0039) 0.0086**  (0.0039) 
1986  0.5210 0.5159 0.0051 (0.0035)  0.0046 (0.0039)  0.0042 (0.0039)  0.0043 (0.0039) 
1987  0.5241  0.5114  0.0127***  (0.0034) 0.0122**  (0.0047) 0.0118**  (0.0048) 0.0119**  (0.0048) 
1988  0.5279  0.5202  0.0077**  (0.0036) 0.0072  (0.0047) 0.0066  (0.0046) 0.0066  (0.0046) 
1989  0.5290  0.5159  0.0131*** (0.0035)  0.0127*** (0.0039)  0.0119*** (0.0041)  0.0119*** (0.0041) 
1990  0.5325  0.5185  0.0141***  (0.0051) 0.0136**  (0.0063) 0.0127* (0.0064) 0.0125* (0.0064) 
            
1980-1990  0.5234  0.5124  0.0110*** (0.0011)  0.0106*** (0.0023)  0.0101*** (0.0022)  0.0101*** (0.0022) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the 
child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 1 with a total of 3,856,489 observations (see Table 1). Column (6) reports the DD estimates 
with the control vector of province dummies, and column (7) reports the DD estimates controlling for both province and rural dummies.   42
 
Table 3: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the probability of being a boy by birth order, family size, and gender composition of elder 
siblings 
  Birth order=1  Birth order=2  Birth order>2 
  DD (1)  DD (2)  DD (1)  DD (2)  DD (1)  DD (2) 
                       
By birth order                   
 0.0034  (0.0043)  0.0033 (0.0039) 0.0095 (0.0061) 0.0100*  (0.0061) 0.0259*** (0.0071) 0.0254*** (0.0078) 
                       
By family size and birth order 
Family size=1   0.0106  (0.0213)  0.0117  (0.0205)                
Family size=2  - 0.0013  (0.0082)  0.0023  (0.0126) 0.0331*** (0.0113) 0.0310*** (0.0106)        
Family size>2  - 0.0091  (0.0100)  -0.0087 (0.0100) -0.0233** (0.0134)  -0.0232*  (0.0136) 0.0259*** (0.0071) 0.0254*** (0.0078) 
                       
By birth order and gender composition of elder sibling(s) 
One  boy         -0.0105  (0.0086) -0.0103  (0.0085)       
One girl           0.0277**  (0.0118) 0.0279*** (0.0086)        
                        
Two boys                  -0.0264  (0.0245) -0.0177  (0.0241) 
One girl, one boy                  0.0141  (0.0130) 0.0144  (0.0126) 
Two girls                  0.0376**  (0.0179) 0.0335*  (0.0182) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the 
child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 2 with a total of 1,880,322 observations (see Table 1). DD (1) refers to the DD estimates 
without control variables, and DD (2) refers to DD estimates controlling for rural, province, and mother and father’s education level dummies.   43
 
Table 4: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the probability of being a boy by registration type 
Dependent variable: Gender 
Birth cohort  Rural    Urban 
  DD estimates  DD estimates 
(control provincial indicators)
  DD estimates  DD estimates 
(control provincial indicators) 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Post-policy change 
period 
           
          
1980  0.0084* (0.0044) 0.0085* (0.0043)   0.0025 (0.0154)  0.0017 (0.0153) 
1981  0.0170***  (0.0038) 0.0167***  (0.0038)   0.0132 (0.0128)  0.0123 (0.0125) 
1982  0.0053  (0.0070) 0.0049  (0.0070)   0.0293***  (0.0108)  0.0286***  (0.0106) 
1983  0.0163***  (0.0049) 0.0158***  (0.0049)   -  0.0047 (0.0104)  0.0053 (0.0103) 
1984  0.0144***  (0.0043) 0.0142***  (0.0043)   0.0035 (0.0128)  0.0026 (0.0133) 
1985  0.0130***  (0.0035) 0.0130***  (0.0034)   -  0.0168 (0.0118) -  0.0183 (0.0118) 
1986  0.0068* (0.0040) 0.0064  (0.0041)     -  0.0065 (0.0124) -  0.0074 (0.0122) 
1987  0.0145**  (0.0063) 0.0140**  (0.0064)     -  0.0001 (0.0112) -  0.0013 (0.0110) 
1988  0.0108**  (0.0052) 0.0101* (0.0052)   -  0.0099 (00110) -  0.0116 (0.0108) 
1989  0.0169***  (0.0042) 0.0161***  (0.0044)   -  0.0041 (0.0103) -  0.0058 (0.0098) 
1990  0.0164**  (0.0070) 0.0153**  (0.0073)   0.0077 (0.0139)  0.0073 (0.0136) 
             
1980-1990  0.0126***  (0.0028) 0.0122***  (0.0027)   0.0008 (0.0069)     0.0003 (0.0067) 
          
Provincial dummies No  Yes    No  Yes 
             
N 3,242,991    613,498 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the 
child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 1 with a total of 3,856,489 observations (see Table 1). Columns (2) and (4) report the DD 
estimates with the control vector of provincial dummies for rural and urban subsamples, respectively. 
 
   44
 
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on other outcome variables 
    Total population    Rural residents 
Dependent variables    DD    DD 
            
            
Family structure             
# Aged 64+ in the household    -0.0066  (0.0059)    -0.0082  (0.0065) 
Father is the household head    0.0018  (0.0026)    0.0010  (0.0017) 
            
Age at the first birth             
Mother's age at the first birth    0.0084  (0.0898)    -0.0259  (0.0876) 
            
Father            
Education level    0.0580  (0.0360)    0.0519  (0.0343) 
Senior School    0.0146  (0.0158)    0.0090  (0.0146) 
College and higher    -0.0007  (0.0028)    -0.0017  (0.0013) 
Working   -0.0013*  (0.0007)    -0.0009  (0.0006) 
On-farm working          -0.0072  (0.0052) 
Off-farm working          0.0065  (0.0052) 
Unable to work    0.0006  (0.0004)    0.0004  (0.0002) 
            
Mother            
Education level    0.1004**  (0.0450)   0.1030**  (0.0412) 
Senior School    0.0141  (0.0131)    0.0085  (0.0088) 
College and higher    -0.0017  (0.0026)    0.0001  (0.0003) 
Working   -0.0082  (0.0058)    -0.0074  (0.0046) 
On-farm working          -0.0048  (0.0048) 
Off-farm working          -0.0026  (0.0024) 
Unable to work    -0.0001  (0.0001)    -0.0001  (0.0001) 
            
N   1,880,322    1,621,821 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
provincial indicators are controlled for in all regressions. The data set used is Sample 2 (see Table 1). 
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Table 6: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the probability of being a boy: Provinces versus autonomous regions 
  Dependent variable: Gender 
  Percentage of the total population (%)  Percentage of Han (%)  DD estimates  DD estimates with rural dummy 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Provinces  91.15  93.59  0.0070*** (0.0026) 0.0070*** (0.0026) 
Autonomous  regions  8.85  56.33  0.0226*** (0.0067) 0.0223*** (0.0065) 
           
Inner-Mongolia  2.17  77.14    0.0098  (0.0087)        0.0102  (0.0087) 
Guangxi Zhuang  4.47  58.68      0.0245***  (0.0050)      0.0241***  (0.0050) 
Tibet  0.25     0.35   -  0.0409  (0.1857)        - 0.0499  (0.1881) 
Ningxia Hui  0.42  62.73      0.0358**  (0.0168)    0.0367**  (0.0170) 
Xinjiang Uyghur  1.53  27.62      0.0183*  (0.0093)    0.0185**  (0.0094) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the 
child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 1 with a total of 3,856,489 observations (see Table 1). The first panel reports the DD estimates 
for provinces and autonomous regions, respectively, and the second panel reports the DD estimates for each of the five autonomous regions, respectively. 
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Table 7: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the probability of being a 
boy by using the 2000 census and 2005 mini-census 
Dependent variable: Gender 
2000 census  2005 mini-census 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Han 0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)  (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Treat 0.0119***  0.0134*** 0.0137*** 0.0131** 0.0134*  0.0138* 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)  (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
DD 0.0152***  0.0135*** 0.0137*** 0.0158*** 0.0143*** 0.0140***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)  (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Constant 0.5149***  0.5169*** 0.5137*** 0.5149*** 0.5214*** 0.5234***
(0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0040)  (0.0013) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Rural indictor  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Province indicators  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
N 3033321  3033321  3033321  1656094  1656094  1656094 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, otherwise 0. 
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by the one-child policy
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
1973-1979 (1990 census)  106.31 
1980-1990 (1990 census)  111.01  4.70  4.40  93.62% 
1991-2000 (2000 census)  118.53  12.22  6.98  57.12% 
2001-2005 (2005 mini-census)  119.39  13.08  7.01  53.59% 
 
Note: Column (1) reports actual sex ratios at different periods; column (2) calculates the total increases in sex 
ratio in periods of 1980-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2005, comparing to the period of 1973-1979 (Sex ratio1980- 
1990 - Sex ratio1973-1979, Sex ratio1990-2000 - Sex ratio1973-1979, Sex ratio2001-2005 - Sex ratio1973-1979); column (3) 
calculates the effect of the one-child policy on sex ratio by using Equation (3); column (4) calculates the 
percentage of the total increase in sex ratio accounted for by the one-child policy (column (3)/column (2)). 